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Abstract
A quantum game can be viewed as a state preparation in which the
final output state results from the competing preferences of the players
over the set of possible output states that can be produced. It is therefore
possible to view state preparation in general as being the output of some
appropriately chosen (notional) quantum game. This reverse engineering
approach in which we seek to construct a suitable notional game that
produces some desired output state as its equilibrium state may lead to
different methodologies and insights. With this goal in mind we examine
the notion of preference in quantum games since if we are interested in the
production of a particular equilibrium output state, it is the competing
preferences of the players that determine this equilibrium state. We show
that preferences on output states can be viewed in certain cases as being
induced by measurement with an appropriate set of numerical weightings,
or payoffs, attached to the results of that measurement. In particular we
show that a distance-based preference measure on the output states is
equivalent to a having a strictly-competitive set of payoffs on the results
of some measurement.
1 Introduction
Whilst there are important issues to resolve in our full understanding of the
relationship between correlation, entanglement and non-classical properties, it
is clear that quantum mechanics admits possibilities for behaviours that can-
not be achieved by any purely classical system. The introduction of quantum
mechanical ideas in game theory is one example where entanglement offers the
potential to achieve game results that cannot be obtained when playing games
with classical objects obeying the laws of classical physics [1,2].
In our previous work we have argued for the importance of the notion of
playable games; that is, games that can actually be played, or implemented,
with objects that have a physical reality and obey physical laws [3-5]. This
perspective allows a general framework for the description of a game (either
quantum or classical) to be developed in which the comparisons between classical
and quantum behaviours can more easily be drawn. In this perspective a game,
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either quantum or classical, can be seen as a state preparation where the state
that is actually prepared is a function of the initial state, the actions available
to the players and their competing preferences over the possible states that can
be produced.
If games are state preparations, then might not the converse be true? Can
we view state preparations as the output of certain quantum games? If this
is possible then we can view state preparations from a game-theoretic perspec-
tive. Instead of asking the question whether quantum games give us results
unobtainable in classical games, the shift in view to state preparation asks the
question whether we can re-interpret quantum behaviours in a game-theoretic
way. In our previous work we have expressed this notion as that of ‘gaming the
quantum’ rather than the usual approach in quantum games of ‘quantizing the
game’ [3]. In this way we ask whether the tools of game theory can be applied to
quantum mechanics, just as they are applied to fields like economics or biology,
in order to give us different insights or different computational methodologies.
With this goal in mind therefore, it is important to construct the right
conceptual framework for working within this perspective. If we’re interested in
state preparations then the states that are prepared result from the competing
actions of the players. The players must have some reason, some preference, for
the preparation of one state over another. Therefore the appropriate language
is that of preference. The players have some preference for the states they wish
to be output from a game and it is the competing preferences of the players
that result in a particular output state.
Accordingly, in this paper we wish to explore the notion of preference in
quantum games. It is common in game theory to associate numerical weight-
ings, which for clarity we term payoffs, with measurement results1 to express
a preference; each player attempting to act in such a way as to maximise the
numerical value of his or her payoff. Thus in classical Prisoner’s Dilemma we
might envision coins initially prepared in the state (H,H) with the players each
given one coin that they can flip or leave alone. The players will produce one of
4 possible output states of the coins which can then be determined (measured)
and the measurement result mapped to some specific payoff. For example, if
the players produce the output state (H,H) then the payoff for the players is
commonly expressed as the tuple (3, 3) and the output state (H,T ) is associ-
ated with the payoff tuple (0, 5). In classical games the act of measurement is,
in general, taken to be a passive action which does not affect the output state
produced by the players. The resulting matrix of payoff tuples for the possible
actions of the players then determines the particular actions that will be chosen,
assuming rational players.
In quantum mechanics, however, the act of measurement is anything but a
passive process. If we consider an ideal von Neumann measurement then, unless
the output states produced by the players are eigenstates of the measurement
1Here we make explicit that even in a classical game the output state produced by the
players in a playable game has to be measured. Of course in most classical games this can
be safely ignored since measurement does not disturb the output (pre-measurement) state
produced by the players.
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operator, the measurement will project the output state of the players onto a new
state according to some probability distribution. The quantum measurement
thus furnishes an expected payoff for the players. As we have shown [4], if the
players act in such a way as to maximize their expected payoffs, this can lead to
a transformation of a game in the sense that although the players initially have
some preference over the measurement eigenstates (expressed by some numerical
weighting) these lead to an induced preference over the output states as given
by the ordering of the expected payoffs. The initial weightings associated with
the measurement results may be consistent with a game of Prisoner’s Dilemma,
say, but the players make their choice according to an analysis of the expected
payoffs and may end up playing a game with the preferences of Chicken rather
than Prisoner’s Dilemma.
This feature of game transformation, as decribed above, is not unique to
quantum mechanics and can occur in strictly classical games in which there is
a distribution over measurement results. Such a distribution can occur, for ex-
ample, if the choices of the players are communicated over a noisy channel. The
important feature is that the initial preferences over the measurement results,
expressed by numerical weightings, induce a preference on the pre-measurement
output states. It is these induced preferences that determine the game the play-
ers actually play and not the initial preferences on the measurement eigenstates.
In this paper we explore a description of quantum games in terms of prefer-
ences over the pre-measurement output states. We show that a game in which
there are strictly competitive preferences defined on the measurement eigen-
states is equivalent to a game in which the preferences over the pre-measurement
output states are defined according to a distance from some most-preferred state.
As we have previously shown, preferences on output states based on distance
have a nice geometric interpretation [3]. Our result here shows that any quantum
game with a strictly-competitive weighting on the measurement eigenstates can
be interpreted using this geometrical treatment on the pre-measurement output
states.
2 General Formulation of a Discrete Quantum
Game
We define a Discrete Quantum Game (DQG) as one in which the players have a
finite set of actions from which to choose; the actions being unitary transforma-
tions of the input state. There will, therefore, be a finite set of possible output
states produced by the players. Of course, in many quantum game formulations
the players can access a continuum of possibilities (such as a general rotation
of a qubit). For convenience we restrict our analysis to the case of a DQG, but
the main results carry over to the continuum case in a straightforward manner.
The basic elements are the following:
• There is some initial state |ψin〉
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• The players have some finite set of available operations with which they
can modify the input state. We denote the operations available to player
1 by {αˆ1, . . . , αˆm} and those available to player 2 by
{
βˆ1, . . . , βˆn
}
• The set of possible output states that can be produced is denoted by Ψout
and there are up to a total of mn possible distinct output states that can
be produced. In other words |Ψout| ≤ mn
• Ψout ⊂ Ψ where Ψ is the set of all possible states of the physical system
on which the players operate
The final element required to be able to describe this as a game is that the
players have some preference over the output states that are produced. If the
set of output states is written as
Ψout = {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , . . . , |ψmn〉}
then the preferences of each player are equivalent to different orderings of this
set. The players thus choose an operation from their available set in order to
produce their most preferred output state given that their opponent is doing
the same. It is this ‘push-pull’ on the possible output states that leads to
the production of an equilibrium state, where such an equilibrium exists. The
general formulation of a DQG is shown in figure 1
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Figure 1 : the general description of a discrete quantum game
(DQG). The players each have a finite set of available unitary oper-
ations which act on some initial state. The players have competing
preferences over the set of possible output states Ψout that can be
prepared The actual state |ψin〉 ∈ Ψout that is prepared depends on
the theoretical analysis the players undertake of each others’ choices
based upon their knowledge of the available operations and prefer-
ences.
2.1 Quantum Formulation of Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma
As an example of the application of this formalism we consider the implemen-
tation of the standard version of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) using 2 spin-1/2
particles. The initial state is expressed in the computational basis (taken to
be eigenstates of the spin-z operator) as |00〉. The players each have a parti-
cle on which to act and the available operations are
{
αˆ1 = Iˆ1, αˆ2 = Fˆ1
}
and{
βˆ1 = Iˆ2, βˆ2 = Fˆ2
}
for players A and B, respectively, and Iˆ and Fˆ are the iden-
tity and spin-flip operators acting on particles 1 and 2. There are thus 4 possible
output states that can be produced which can be labelled as
|ψ1〉 = αˆ1βˆ1 |ψin〉 = |00〉
|ψ2〉 = αˆ1βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |01〉
|ψ3〉 = αˆ2βˆ1 |ψin〉 = |10〉
|ψ4〉 = αˆ2βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |11〉 (1)
In PD the preferences over these output states can be expressed for players A
and B as
A : |ψ3〉  |ψ1〉  |ψ4〉  |ψ2〉
B : |ψ2〉  |ψ1〉  |ψ4〉  |ψ3〉 (2)
It is common to express the preferences in terms of some numerical weighting
over the measurement results with respect to some measurement operator. If
a measurement of spin-z is made on both particles the set of eigenstates of
the measurement operator is equal to the set of possible output states that
the players produce. The usual weightings for PD, given by a mapping of a
numerical value to the measurement states, are
|00〉 −→ (3, 3)
|01〉 −→ (0, 5)
|10〉 −→ (5, 0)
|11〉 −→ (1, 1) (3)
There is nothing particularly quantum mechanical about this form of PD. In-
deed, we could view this quantum formulation of the game as an expensive
implementation of the classical version.
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In this formulation of the game the possible output states that can be pro-
duced by the players are the eigenstates of the measurement operator. However,
we are not restricted to consideration of this particular measurement. The pos-
sible output states may not be eigenstates of the subsequent measurement oper-
ator2. The measurement will then yield a measurement result with a particular
probability. In order to translate this to a preference on the output states we
must consider some measure such as the expected payoffs for the players for each
possible output state.
In general, therefore, a set of preferences that is induced on the output
states via application of the mapping of numerical weights to the measurement
states and consideration of the expected outcome need not be equal to the ini-
tial preferences over the measurement results. This is obvious from the DQG
formalism since if we denote the set of measurement eigenstates as Ψmeas then
the cardinalities of the sets Ψmeas and Ψout are only equal in special cases.
2.2 Games Using the EWL Protocol
In their ground-breaking paper on quantum games Eisert, Wilkens and Lewen-
stein (EWL) proposed the following structure for a game played with 2 qubits
represented by a pair of spin-1/2 particles [2]. The qubits are prepared in some
initial state (for convenience often taken to be the ground state |00〉 with re-
spect to some spin direction). An entanglement operator Eˆ is applied to the
qubits and each player receives on of the particles. The players can then ap-
ply some local unitary rotation to their particle which we denote by UˆA(B). A
disentangling operator Eˆ−1 is then applied to the qubits and a measurement of
spin in some given direction is made on each particle. A set of weightings on
the output states is given which reflect the classical game which the quantum
version generalizes.
This protocol has become the de facto standard in treatments of quan-
tum games (see, for example, the brief selection [6-12] which illustrate some
interesting and important results obtained using this protocol). The entan-
gling/disentangling step is to exploit the resource of entanglement whilst still
allowing the players to perform local operations on their respective particle.
It is a clever protocol which reduces to the classical game (described by the
measurement weightings) in the appropriate limit [13]. The perception that the
players only act on their own particle is, however, something of an illusion. The
DQG formalism for playable games shows that in reality the players are acting
on the input state, which in the case of the EWL protocol is a maximally entan-
gled state. The EWL protocol is equivalent to a game in which the players are
2Consider, for example, a measurement of spin at some angle θ with respect to z. The set
of measurement results will be the eigenstates
{|00〉θ , |01〉θ , |10〉θ , |11〉θ} the particular state
obtained upon measurement being determined by a probability distribution dependent upon
θ. If we establish some preference over these measurement results via a mapping to a tuple
of outcomes for each eigenstate, then the expected outcome tuples for the players will induce
a set of preferences on the output states. In the extreme case, θ = pi/2, each possible output
state is equally preferred via this induced preference.
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given the set of available operations
{
Eˆ−1UˆAEˆ
}
and
{
Eˆ−1UˆBEˆ
}
, for players
A and B, respectively. In effect in games of this structure the players act on
both particles.
It is clear in the EWL protocol that we have only 4 measurement eigenstates
but a continuum of available operations for the players, and therefore a contin-
uum of possible output states. It is important that the available operations
available to the players do not provide a map of the initial state onto the space
of all possible 2 qubit states, Ψ, otherwise equilibrium cannot be attained. The
operator sets
{
Eˆ−1UˆAEˆ
}
and
{
Eˆ−1UˆBEˆ
}
only produce a subset of the set of
possible 2 qubit states. Indeed, in the case of the EWL protocol, the available
operations cannot access the set of maximally entangled states of 2 qubits and
so Ψout ⊂ Ψ.
The weightings on the measurement eigenstates induce a set of preferences
on this subset via the expected payoffs for the players. It is then clear why
EWL results in an enhanced equilibrium payoff for the players for Prisoner’s
Dilemma; we are no longer playing standard PD but a different game3. It is
possible to find a classical extension of PD with correlated classical noise which
gives the same enhancement of the equilibrium payoff [4].
2.3 Non-Commuting Games
The DQG treatment of the EWL protocol highlights another interesting feature
of quantum games. It is possible to consider games in which the operations
available to the players do not commute. In terms of games in which we have
2 qubits we then envision a game in which the players have the capability of
affecting each other’s particle. So we can define a non-commuting game as a
game in which
[
αˆi, βˆj
]
6= 0 for at least one choice of i and j.
In the DQG formalism we can see that the players act on some initial quan-
tum state |ψin〉 and so, in general, the players act on a single entity in quantum
mechanical terms. It is only in a special class of quantum games where the
Hilbert space can be split into a physically meaningful tensor product HA⊗HB
can we envision the possibility of the players acting on ‘independent’ physical
entities. As we have seen, in the EWL protocol the players only have the illusion
of acting on separate particles; the entanglement operation giving the necessary
connection so that game transformation (and enhancement of equilibrium pay-
off) can be achieved. The standard EWL protocol is a commuting game; the
players only have access to local operations after the initial entanglement and[
Eˆ−1UˆAEˆ , Eˆ−1UˆBEˆ
]
= 0 for any choice of UˆA and UˆB .
Thus, in general, in non-commuting games, the order of play matters. It is
easy to construct simple game examples in which swtiching the order of play
changes the game that is played. This is obvious from the formalism of a DQG
3It is appropriate to view quantum PD as an extension of standard PD implemented with
quantum objects. If we then wish to compare quantum and classical features we must consider
comparison with possible classical extensions of PD.
7
since the set of output states where B plays first is ΨABout =
{
αˆiβˆj |ψin〉
}
and
the set of output states where A plays first is ΨBAout =
{
βˆjαˆi |ψin〉
}
so that for
non-commuting games ΨABout 6= ΨBAout .
2.4 Time Evolution as a Quantum Game
As another illustration of the approach based on preferences and the DQG
perspective consider the following simple and somewhat formal game in which
the operator sets available to the players are{
Iˆ , exp
(
−it
{
Hˆ + ∆Hˆ
2
})}
A
{
Iˆ , exp
(
−it
{
Hˆ −∆Hˆ
2
})}
B
(4)
where Iˆ is the identity, Hˆ is a time-independent Hamiltonian and we sup-
pose that
[
Hˆ,∆Hˆ
]
= 0. If our input state to the game is |ψ (0)〉 then the
4 possible output states are {|ψ (0)〉 , |ψ+ (t)〉 , |ψ− (t)〉 , |ψ (t)〉} where |ψ± (t)〉 =
exp
(
−it
{
Hˆ±∆Hˆ
2
})
|ψ (0)〉 and |ψ (t)〉 = exp
(
−iHˆt
)
|ψ (0)〉. If the players have
preferences on the output states given by
A : |ψ+〉  |ψ (t)〉  |ψ (0)〉  |ψ−〉
B : |ψ−〉  |ψ (0)〉  |ψ (t)〉  |ψ+〉 (5)
then the Nash equilibrium output of this game is |ψ (t)〉 which is simply the
time-evolution of the initial state under the Hamiltonian Hˆ. This is admittedly
a rather contrived and artificial example, but it does illustrate the possibility
of interpreting the evolution of a quantum state as the output of some 2-player
game. Of course, it is clear that there will be an infinite number of possi-
ble games we can construct that yield the desired time-evolved state as the
equilibrium output. If the available operations, and preferences, are suitably
chosen then we may obtain an insight into quantum evolution as a ‘push-pull’
between competing physical processes. Rather speculatively, then, we might ask
whether it is possible to view the path integral approach to quantum mechanics
as a competition between different paths giving an interpretation of the least
action principle as arising from a game-theoretic description.
If the preferences over the output states determine the game the players ac-
tually play, then in a certain sense it is these preferences that have a more funda-
mental character than preferences expressed as numerical weightings over some
measurement results with respect to some given operator; different measurement
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operators may induce different preferences on the possible output states that can
be produced. By shifting the perspective to preferences over the output states,
rather than preferences over some specific set of measurement results we obtain
a more general description of a quantum game. The players are not restricted
to obtaining their preferences on the possible output states via consideration of
a specific measurement and the induced preferences over those output states,
but can use whatever rule they see fit to generate their preference. The only
thing that is important, as far as the analysis of the state preparation as a game
is concerned, is that the players have some preference over the output states.
From where they get their preference over the output states is largely immaterial.
3 Operations and Preferences
In the perspective we have outlined above a game is completely specified by
• the initial state |ψin〉
• the available operations specified by the sets {αˆ1, . . . , αˆm} and
{
βˆ1, . . . , βˆn
}
• an ordering, for each player, on the possible output states |ψij〉 = αˆiβˆj |ψin〉 ∈
Ψout which expresses their preferences on this set. (Equivalently, for a
given initial state, we can view the preferences as orderings on the set of
operations with elements αˆiβˆj)
A game can then be viewed as an algorithmic procedure which takes as
inputs the initial state, the sets of operations, and the preferences over the
states |ψij〉 = αˆiβˆj |ψin〉 and outputs a tuple
{
αˆp, βˆs
}
. If this algorithmic
procedure does not terminate then there is no equilibrium choice for the players.
It is important to note that the preferences on the output states alone are not
sufficient to determine the game that is played. This is nicely illustrated with
the following example.
Consider 2 players playing a game which has a physical implementation using
2 spin-1/2 particles. The initial state is expressed in the computational basis
(taken to be eigenstates of the spin-z operator) as |00〉. The operations available
to the players are {αˆ1, αˆ2} and
{
βˆ1, βˆ2
}
for players A and B, respectively.
There are thus 4 possible output states that can be produced. Let us consider
operations such that we have the set of output states
|ψ1〉 = αˆ1βˆ1 |ψin〉 = |00〉
|ψ2〉 = αˆ1βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |01〉
|ψ3〉 = αˆ2βˆ1 |ψin〉 = |10〉
|ψ4〉 = αˆ2βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |11〉 (6)
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If we denote the operation of flipping the spin of particle 1 by Fˆ1 and the
same operation for particle 2 as Fˆ2, then one way to achieve these possi-
ble output states is to give the players the choices
{
αˆ1 = Iˆ , αˆ2 = Fˆ1
}
and{
βˆ1 = Iˆ , βˆ2 = Fˆ2
}
where Iˆ is the identity operation. If the players have the
preferences defined by the orderings of Ψout
A : |ψ1〉  |ψ2〉  |ψ3〉  |ψ4〉
B : |ψ4〉  |ψ3〉  |ψ2〉  |ψ1〉 (7)
then it is evident that the equilibrium state |ψ2〉 = αˆ1βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |01〉 is produced.
However, if we retain these same preferences over the output states but consider
operators such that
|ψ1〉 = αˆ1βˆ1 |ψin〉 = |00〉
|ψ2〉 = αˆ2βˆ1 |ψin〉 = |01〉
|ψ3〉 = αˆ1βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |10〉
|ψ4〉 = αˆ2βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |11〉 (8)
then the equilibrium state |ψ3〉 = αˆ1βˆ2 |ψin〉 = |10〉 is produced by the game.
We can achieve this game by giving the players the sets of operator choices
A :
{
αˆ, Fˆ2αˆ
}
B :
{
αˆ−1, αˆ−1Fˆ1
}
(9)
where αˆ is any arbitrary unitary transformation that acts on the particles. If
we think in terms of an implementation in which each player is given a ball
which can be switched from a red or blue colour, with the initial state being
that both balls are red, then this latter game is equivalent to giving the players
the ability to play with each other’s balls. It is easy to see from these particular
physical instantiations of the games that they are, in fact, different games. This
is perhaps more clearly seen by examining the preferences over the available
operations. In the former game we have the preferences for player A over the
available operations given by
A : αˆ1βˆ1  αˆ1βˆ2  αˆ2βˆ1  αˆ2βˆ2 (10)
whereas in the latter game we have the preferences
A : αˆ1βˆ1  αˆ2βˆ1  αˆ1βˆ2  αˆ2βˆ2 (11)
Thus whilst we may have the same preferences over the output states in both
games we have different preferences over the set of available operations. It is
clear from this simple example that there will be many ways to assign operations
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to the players that lead to the same set of output states. The same set of
preferences on output states can, therefore, represent different games. With the
proviso that it is in fact a more fundamental perspective to consider preferences
over the set of operations we shall continue to examine the preferences over
the output states in the subsequent sections, assuming that the available set of
operations has been fixed.
4 Preferences in Discrete Quantum Games
In much of the previous work on quantum game theory the preferences over
the output states have largely been derived by reference to some subsequent
measurement that is performed on the output states. The numerical weightings
assigned to the possible measurement results then induce preferences on the pre-
measurement output states via some measure such as the expected outcome for
the players. All that is actually required for the players to determine their choice
of strategy is that they have some preference on the possible pre-measurement
output states that can be produced. The players (assumed rational in their
choice of action) must have some foundation for the theoretical analysis they
undertake in order to decide their choice of operation, before any measurement
or operation is performed, and that foundation is provided by the preferences
on the possible output states.
Of course each player is free to choose a preference over the output states
in any arbitrary way. To illustrate this in a particularly gruesome fashion we
could imagine that one player determines his preferences at random; the random
numbers being generated by removing the legs from one side of a spider and
noting the time it takes for the hapless spider to turn 3 circles4. We are not
interested in such whimsical or bizarre methods for determining a preference
but in those preferences that can be generated by a well-defined prescription
that is related to quantities of physical interest. Examples of such prescriptions
may include
• A known measurement is to be performed. Numerical weightings are as-
signed to the possible measurement results and the players derive their
preferences by ranking the output states in order of decreasing expected
outcomes. This analysis is, obviously, performed pre-measurement. This
is a common way to assign preferences on the output states in a quantum
game; the preferences being induced by the assignment of weights on the
post-measurement states.and the calculation of an expected outcome.
• A preference may be defined by ranking the output states in terms of
their distance from some state |ξ〉 ∈ Ψ. This chosen state |ξ〉 may, or may
not be, a member of the set Ψout. It is necessary that the players choose
to assign their preferences with respect to different states otherwise both
4Players are only assumed rational in their analysis of the preferences that lead to their
choice of action. The players are not required to have a rational basis for their choice of
preference.
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players generate identical preferences over the output states and we do not
have a game. Thus player A may be interested in minimizing the distance
of the output states from some arbitrary state |ξA〉 whereas player B may
minimize the distance with respect to some state |ξB〉
• Player A may assign his preference on the output states by requiring that
the variance of the output states with respect to some measurement MˆA is
minimized. Player B may seek to produce an output state that minimizes
the variance with respect to some measurement MˆB . Again, it is necessary
that the players seek to minimize the variance with respect to different
operators otherwise they generate an identical ordering (preference) on
the output states.
• The players may wish to choose an output state that maximizes the Shan-
non information with respect to some operator. Again the operator choices
made by the players, for the purpose of defining their preference, should
not be the same.
These few examples are clearly not an exhaustive list of all the interesting,
and physically relevant, ways in which the players can generate their preferences
on the output states. As these examples illustrate, it is necessary that the players
generate a different ordering (preference) on the set of possible pre-measurement
output states.
As a possible speculative example of this approach let us consider a quantum
computation that produces some desired output state |λ〉. If we identify this as
the Nash equilibrium state of some game between 2 players then the challenge is
to find a game such that it produces the desired computation as an equilibrium
output for any choice of input. The preferences over the output states may then
be translated to preferences over some measurement on the output states. If
we can find such a game, and such a measurement, then we have a model of
a quantum computation as a 2-player game. It may be technically easier to
implement this game than to build the various quantum logic gates required.
Whilst it appears possible to theoretically construct such games and measure-
ments for very simple quantum computations it seems to be highly non-trivial
to demonstrate this in general.
4.1 Preferences Induced By Measurement
We now consider a situation where the players determine their preferences over
the output states by analysis of the results of a subsequent measurement. As
above we assume some known input state |ψin〉 upon which the players can
act with a discrete set of operations specified by the sets {αˆ1, . . . , αˆm} and{
βˆ1, . . . , βˆn
}
. There are thus up to mn possible pre-measurement output states
that can be produced given by
|ψij〉 = αˆiβˆj |ψin〉
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It is often assumed that the Hilbert space of the initial input system is the
product space H = HA ⊗HB in order to allow each player to act on a separate
physical entity (the typical scenario being the space of 2 spin-1/2 particles rep-
resenting 2 qubits). This division is not strictly necessary and if we allow the
possibility of entanglement (either through specification of an initial state or
actions allowed by the players) then, strictly speaking, we must consider the 2
particles as a single entity defined by a single state as we have described above.
• The subsequent measurement on the output states is described by the
operator
Mˆ =
∑
k
ϕk |ϕk〉 〈ϕk| (12)
where Mˆ |ϕk〉 = ϕk |ϕk〉 and we assume an ideal measurement. The set of
measurement eigenstates will be denoted by ΨM .
• The measurement of Mˆ , made on the output state |ψij〉 = αˆiβˆj |ψin〉,
results in the eigenstate |ϕk〉 with probability |〈ψij |ϕk〉|2
• To each eigenstate |ϕk〉 a tuple is assigned, denoted by
(
ωAk , ω
B
k
)
which
gives the payoff for the players, for that particular measurement result
• The expected payoffs for the players, for each possible pre-measurement
output state, are given by〈
OˆA
〉
ij
=
∑
k
ωAk |〈ψij |ϕk〉|2
〈
OˆB
〉
ij
=
∑
k
ωBk |〈ψij |ϕk〉|2 (13)
• OˆA and OˆB are the formal Hermitian outcome operators〈
OˆA
〉
=
∑
k
ωAk |ϕk〉 〈ϕk|
〈
OˆB
〉
=
∑
k
ωBk |ϕk〉 〈ϕk| (14)
• Ranking the expected outcomes in numerical order gives each an induced
preference on the possible pre-measurement output states. It is these
induced preferences which the players analyse in order to determine their
choice of action from the sets {αˆ1, . . . , αˆm} and
{
βˆ1, . . . , βˆn
}
and thus the
induced preferences determine the game the players actually play, even
though the weightings assigned to the measurement results may reflect a
different game
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This structure defines induced preferences based on a calculation of the ex-
pected outcomes. One could, for example, also envision inducing preferences on
the pre-measurement output states by the calculation of some expectation of a
function of the output operators
〈
f
(
OˆA
)〉
and
〈
f
(
OˆB
)〉
. As we have noted
above, the players are free to determine their preferences in whatever way they
see fit. Once their preferences have been fixed, and assuming rational players,
it is then a computational matter to determine what their best choice of action
is (if one exists). In games of complete information each player can thus predict
the action of the other where a fixed (equilibrium) action exists.
4.2 Preferences Based on a Distance Measure
A measure that yields a geometric interpretation is that of distance. Thus we
might suppose that player A wishes to get as close as possible, as determined by
this distance measure, to some state |piA〉 whereas player B is trying to minimize
the distance of the output states to some other state |piB〉. Of course, it may be
that
∣∣piA(B)〉 /∈ Ψout, so the players rank the possible output states in terms of
increasing
∣∣〈ψij ∣∣piA(B)〉∣∣2 if the square overlap is used as the distance measure.
Let us consider the set Ψ of all states for the physical system upon which the
players act. For a DQG we clearly have Ψout ⊂ Ψ. That is, the actions available
to the players do not produce a map of the input state onto the complete set
of possible states of the physical system. We now consider 3 ways of defining
preferences on the set of possible pre-measurement output states:
1. P1 : We define a preference directly on the output states by ordering them
according to their distance from some global most preferred state. The
global maximum is the state we would most prefer to be the output given
a choice over the entire Hilbert space of outputs Ψ. This global most
preferred state will be the state that maximises the expected outcome〈
OˆA(B)
〉
for some measurement and associated numerical weights.
2. P2 : We define a preference directly on the output states by ordering them
according to their distance from some local most preferred state, where
this is defined as the output state from the set of possible output states
that minimizes the distance to the globally most preferred state defined
in preference P1. Thus the distance is defined strictly in terms of the
possible output states which are all contained within Ψout
3. P3 : We define a set of preferences over the measurement eigenstates of
some operator, as expressed by some weightings. These then induce a
preference over the output states by calculation of the expected outcomes
for each possible output state in Ψout. Note that, if we denote the set
of measurement eigenstates by Ψmeas then it is possible to have Ψmeas ∩
Ψout = ∅
14
We denote the global state (the state in the universal set Ψ) that maximises〈
OˆA(B)
〉
by
∣∣ΓA(B)〉 and the local state (the state in the restricted set Ψout)
that maximises
〈
OˆA(B)
〉
by
∣∣γA(B)〉5. Because the available operations of the
players do not map the input state to Ψ the local maximum state does not
necessarily equal the global maximum state. If the actual state produced by
the players is |ψout〉 ∈ Ψout then we have〈
OˆA
〉
=
∑
k
ωAk |〈ψout |ϕk〉|2 ≤
∑
k
ωAk |〈γA |ϕk〉|2 ≤
∑
k
ωAk |〈ΓA |ϕk〉|2
〈
OˆB
〉
=
∑
k
ωBk |〈ψout |ϕk〉|2 ≤
∑
k
ωBk |〈γB |ϕk〉|2 ≤
∑
k
ωBk |〈ΓB |ϕk〉|2
(15)
The preference definitions P1 and P2 are not equivalent. This can easily be
seen by consideration of the following output states Ψout = {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , |ψ3〉} of
a game played with a single qubit such that
|ψ1〉 = a |0〉+ b |1〉
|ψ2〉 = b |0〉 − a |1〉
|ψ3〉 = c |0〉+ d |1〉 (16)
with a, b, c, d ∈ R such that a2 > b2 > c2 and we assume the global most
preferred state is |0〉. Defining a preference based on distance to this globally
most preferred state leads to the preference ordering on the outputs
P1 : |ψ1〉  |ψ2〉  |ψ3〉 (17)
However, using the preference definition P2 and defining a preference based on
the distance to the locally most preferred state |ψ1〉 = a |0〉 + b |1〉 yields the
ordering
P2 : |ψ1〉  |ψ3〉  |ψ2〉 (18)
Let us now consider a preference measure defined by P3 such that we have
the preferences of a strictly competitive game defined on the measurement eigen-
states. With a suitable labelling of these eigenstates we can, using numerical
weightings, express the preferences of player A as
|ϕ1〉 −→ a
|ϕj〉 −→ b (j 6= 1)
a > b (19)
5Note that OˆA(B) are not specified; we merely note that such operators representing
measurements exist. Indeed, one of the challenges when we work with preferences on pre-
measurement states is to construct the observables and weightings that realize those prefer-
ences.
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giving the ordering on the measurement eigenstates as
|ϕ1〉  |ϕ2〉 = |ϕ3〉 = |ϕ4〉 = . . . (20)
If we assume a ranking according to expected payoff, this preference on the
(post-measurement) eigenstates induces a preference on the (pre-measurement)
output states. The expected outcome for each possible output state is〈
OˆA
〉
ij
=
∑
k
ωAk |〈ψij |ϕk〉|2 = a |〈ψij |ϕ1〉|2 + b
∑
k=2
|〈ψij |ϕk〉|2
= (a− b) |〈ψij |ϕ1〉|2 + b (21)
But this gives an ordering on the pre-measurement output states according to
their the distance from the most preferred post-measurement state |ϕ1〉. Thus
the preferences on the pre-measurement states induced by assuming strictly
competitive preferences on the post-measurement states, and a ranking accord-
ing to the expected payoff, are the same preferences on the possible outputs that
we obtain from P1 when |ϕ1〉 /∈ Ψout (or P2 when |ϕ1〉 ∈ Ψout). In other words,
a distance ordering on the pre-measurement output states is equivalent to as-
suming the preferences of a strictly competitive game on the post-measurement
states. We thus obtain the result that if the (globally) most preferred state of
a player is an eigenstate of some Hermitian operator:
the preference defined by the distance to some state |ξ〉 is equivalent
to a strictly-competitive ordering, by weighting, on the eigenstates
of some Hermitian operator Mˆ such that |ξ〉 is an eigenstate of Mˆ
that is assigned the biggest weight, where the expected outcome is
the quantity the players wish to maximise
4.2.1 A simple strictly-competitive game
In order to illustrate the equivalence of distance-ordering on the outputs and
a strictly-competitive ordering on the measurement results we will consider the
2-qubit example discussed above. In this case we have the set of output states
and the set of measurement eigenstates given by
Ψout = {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , |ψ3〉 , |ψ4〉}
Ψmeas = {|ϕ1〉 , |ϕ2〉 , |ϕ3〉 , |ϕ4〉} (22)
As above we will assume that |ϕ1〉 is the most preferred measurement state and
that |ψ1〉 will denote the most preferred output state (we can always relabel the
states so that this is true). Now let us assume an ordering according to P1. Let
us assume that we have
|〈ΓA |ψ1〉|2 > |〈ΓA |ψ2〉|2 > |〈ΓA |ψ3〉|2 > |〈ΓA |ψ4〉|2 (23)
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where |ΓA〉 is the global maximum state, or the state |ΓA〉 ∈ Ψ that is the most
preferred state out of all possible states on the Hilbert space. This is equivalent
to an ordering of the output states given by
|ψ1〉  |ψ2〉  |ψ3〉  |ψ4〉
Now let us consider the preferences defined by P3. In this case we have, as
above, that
|ϕ1〉 −→ a
{|ϕ2〉 , |ϕ3〉 , |ϕ4〉} −→ b
a > b (24)
so that the preferences are, initially, defined on the measurement set Ψmeas.
The expected payoffs are given by〈
OˆA
〉
j
= a |〈ψj |ϕ1〉|2 + b
(
1− |〈ψj |ϕ1〉|2
)
j = 1, 2, 3, 4 (25)
However, in the perspective of P3, the global maximum state |ΓA〉 is just the
most preferred state from Ψmeas. Thus we have that |ΓA〉 = |ϕ1〉. Further, by
assumption we have that
|〈ΓA |ψ1〉|2 > |〈ΓA |ψ2〉|2 > |〈ΓA |ψ3〉|2 > |〈ΓA |ψ4〉|2 (26)
which is equivalent to the ordering
|〈ϕ1 |ψ1〉|2 > |〈ϕ1 |ψ2〉|2 > |〈ϕ1 |ψ3〉|2 > |〈ϕ1 |ψ4〉|2 (27)
which gives the ordering of the expected payoffs〈
OˆA
〉
1
>
〈
OˆA
〉
2
>
〈
OˆA
〉
3
>
〈
OˆA
〉
4
(28)
which is, of course, equivalent to an ordering on the output states of
|ψ1〉  |ψ2〉  |ψ3〉  |ψ4〉 (29)
Thus, for this strictly-competitive example, the preference definitions P1 and
P3 are entirely equivalent; in both cases we obtain an ordering of the output
states that is dependent of the distance of the output states from the most
preferred global state, where distance is expressed by the projection |〈ψj |ϕ1〉|2.
Note that in P1 this preference is defined directly on the output states whereas
in P3 this preference is induced on the output states. Thus, for this example,
defining the preferences by a preference over the measurement results as
|ϕ1〉  |ϕ2〉 = |ϕ3〉 = |ϕ4〉 (30)
yields an ordering of the output states that is the same ordering obtained from
P1.
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4.2.2 Preferences Based on Variances
Here we suppose that player A assigns his preference on the (pre-measurement)
output states by requiring that the variance of these output states with respect
to some subsequent measurement MˆA is minimized. Player B seeks to produce
an output state that minimizes the variance with respect to some measurement
MˆB . It is important to emphasize that the players must have some foundation
upon which to base their theoretical analysis leading to their choice of ‘move’
in the game. Clearly this theoretical analysis is undertaken before any mea-
surement is actually performed. Equally clearly, any physical instantiation of
the game (that is, to actually play the game with physical objects and pro-
cesses) will require some measurement to be performed. Here we are supposing
that the foundation is supplied by a preference for minimizing variances of the
pre-measurement ouput states with respect to specific observables.
For convenience we shall suppose that MˆA and MˆB are complementary ob-
servables. If the eigenstates of these operators are
∣∣ϕAi 〉 and ∣∣ϕBj 〉, respectively,
then the eigenstates are related by
∣∣ϕAi 〉 = 1√
N
N∑
j=1
exp (iθj)
∣∣ϕBj 〉 (31)
Player A is thus wishing to produce an output state in a game that has the
smallest distance to an eigenstate of MˆA. Equivalently player A wishes to
maximise the distance to eigenstates of MˆB . The players thus generate opposite
preferences based on distance to some preferred set of states. We can realize
these preferences by setting up a strictly-competitive game as we have discussed
above.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have considered a new perspective on quantum games by con-
sidering preferences on pre-measurement output states produced by the play-
ers. Once the operations (‘moves’) available to the players are fixed then, for a
given input state, these pre-measurement preferences determine the game that is
played. In typical formulations of quantum games where weightings are assigned
to measurement results we have demonstrated that these induce preferences on
the pre-measurement output states [4]. It is these induced preferences the play-
ers use to determine their choice of strategy. In this sense, then, consideration
of pre-measurement preferences is more fundamental since these determine the
actual game that the players play.
We have described a formalism for a discrete quantum game defined by
the pre-measurement preferences (for a given input state and set of available
operations). Knowledge of these is sufficient to determine the choice of strategy
and thus specifies the game. For a 2-player DQG in which there are mn possible
pre-measurement output states the number of possible games that can be played
for a given input state and set of available operations is ∼ (mn!)2 since a player’s
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preference is simply a particular ordering of the set Ψout. There are choices of
ordering (preference) which are more physically appealing than others and we
have discussed examples of these. If we wish to actually play a game then
some measurement must be performed. In general then, the challenge is to find
a measurement and weightings of the measurement results which will induce
the pre-measurement preferences. We have shown that for 2 important and
physically relevant choices of preferences on the pre-measurement output states,
a minimization of distance and variance, the playable game can be realized by
a strictly competitive weighting on the measurement results.
If the players wish to minimize the distance to the states |piA〉 and |piB〉, re-
spectively, then this is equivalent to player A wishing to maximise distinguisha-
bility of the the output state of the game from the state |piB〉 and vice versa for
player B. Playing such a game would then, in an appropriate sense, produce an
equilibrium state (where one exists) that optimises the distinguishability from
both |piA〉 and |piB〉 for the given set of output states that is produced.
In our previous work we have considered a distance based measure on output
states and shown its importance in strictly competitive games. Here we have
shown that a distance based preference measure on pre-measurement output
states is equivalent to a strictly-competitive game defined on the measurement
results. If a particular quantum computation can be identified as the equilibrium
state of a game with a distance measure then we have a simple methodology for
physically constructing such a computation as a strictly competitive game on
measurement results.
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